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The Impact of Peer Ability and Heterogeneity on Student Achievement: 





This  paper  estimates  the  impact  of  peer  achievement  and  variance  on  math  achievement 
growth. It exploits exogenous variation in peer characteristics generated at the transition to 
upper-secondary school in a sample of Berlin fifth graders. Parents and schools are barely 
able to condition their decisions on peer characteristics since classes are newly built up from a 
large pool of elementary school pupils. I find positive peer effects on achievement growth and 
no effects for peer variance. Lower-achieving pupils benefit more from abler peers. Results 
from simulations suggest that pupils are slightly better off in comprehensive than in ability-
tracked school systems. JEL: I21, I28.  
 
Keywords: peer effects in secondary school, comparison between ability-tracked and compre-
hensive school, natural experiment 
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1.  Introduction 
Peer group composition of classes plays an essential role for school choice decisions of par-
ents. Peer effects are also important in debates on school vouchers, desegregation, ability 
tracking or antipoverty programs. This paper investigates the (causal) impact of peer ability 
and heterogeneity on student achievement in math. It exploits exogenous variation in peer 
group characteristics which is generated in newly built up classes at the transition of Berlin 
students to upper-secondary school after the fourth grade.  
All studies about the impact of peer ability are aware of the existence of severe endogeneity 
problems. Choices of parents and school administrators are the most important sources of 
endogeneity because of self-selection. If, for instance, pupils of ambitious parents are more 
likely to be placed into classes with high-achieving and homogenous peers and if such parents 
also support their child's educational progress to a greater extent, then peer characteristics and 
student achievement are spuriously correlated. School principals could also tend to group pu-
pils into classes strategically, particularly if school accountability systems are implemented.
1 
There are two bodies of convincing research   that estimate the impact of peer ability on 
achievement growth: the first extensively makes use of fixed-effects frameworks whereas the 
second aims to exploit exogenous variation generated in (quasi-) experimental settings. Both 
have in common that they estimate models of educational production accounting at least for 
lagged student  and peer  achievement which is assumed to capture  past  family, peer, and 
school inputs.
2 The absence of past achievement, which is the case in cross -sectional data, 
yields biased estimates for the impact of peer ability on student achievement because of sim-
ultaneity: if peers have an influence on a student's achievement, that student will also  affect 
his or her peers' achievement.
3 
Hanushek et al. (2003) and Sund (2009) belong to the first strand of research. Hanushek et al. 
(2003) analyze a large data set of Texas public elementary school pupils (grades three through 
six). Controlling  for fixed student, school,  and school-by-grade effects and a n additional 
number of time-varying student, family, and school characteristics, they find that an increase 
                                                 
1 There is evidence for the existence of school gaming behavior under accountability pressure: threatened schools may reclas-
sify low-achieving students into special education, see Figlio and Getzler (2002). As shown in Jacob and Levitt (2003), some 
of them even manipulate testing conditions by teacher cheating. 
2 One of the earliest studies that estimates such a model of educational production is  Summers and Wolfe (1977). Using a 
data set of sixth-grade elementary school pupils enrolled in schools located in the Philadelphia School Di strict, they find 
positive peer effects on (composite) student achievement. 
3 This problem is also referred to as the "reflection problem", see Manski (1993). 2 
 
in the variance of peer achievement has no significant effect on math learning. Further, a one 
standard deviation increase in peer achievement leads to a roughly 0.2 increase in (standard-
ized) math achievement which is substantial. Sund (2009) also finds positive peer effects 
among Swedish students who are enrolled in upper-secondary education.
4 Accounting for 
time, school, teacher, and individual fixed effects, he additionally shows that lower-achieving 
students beneﬁt more from an increase in peer ability than their higher-achieving classmates. 
To improve validity, he also identifies students that are attending classes in which they have 
no peers from previous grades since this might bias the results. Surprisingly, students are bet-
ter off in classes that are more heterogeneous. 
Alternatively, the second strand of research exploits situations where students are (quasi-) 
randomly grouped into classes. Form the viewpoint of an ideal experiment, random grouping 
of pupils could uncover the causal impact of peer achievement and peer heterogeneity on 
achievement growth since variation in peer characteristics would be exogenous in this set-
ting.
5 Such an event is analyzed in Carrell, Fullerton, and West (2009), where U.S. Air Force 
Academy freshmen are exogenously assigned to peer groups of approximately 30 students. In 
the first year of their university study, these students have limited ability to interact with other 
students outside of their assigned peer group. Therefore these peer groups might be consi d-
ered as classes. The authors find peer effects in math and  science courses but not in foreign 
language courses. No results are reported for the impact of peer heterogeneity.
6  
The results presented here are obtained from a natural experiment in Berlin  upper-secondary 
schools. Each school year, classes at the fifth  grade are newly built up with pupils from a 
large number of elementary schools. This situation is similar to Carrell, Fullerton, and West 
(2009) where peer groups are built up from the pool of Air Force Academy freshmen.  The 
identification strategy, which will be outlined in more detail below, depends on two assump-
tions: (i) parents of fourth graders are not able to condition their school choice decision on 
peer characteristics since clas ses at the fifth grade are built   up in the future.   (ii)  Upper-
secondary schools have limited possibilities to group fifth graders by skill at the beginning of 
a school year – to do so, schools need to monitor pupils for a time.  
                                                 
4 In Sweden, compulsory education is comprehensive and lasts for nine years. Subsequently, pupils have the possibility to 
attend upper-secondary school. 
5 Research designs that seek to mimic such situations are strongly advocated by Angrist and Pischke (2010). 
6 Using the same identification strategy, Sacerdote (2001) reports similar results for the impact of peer e ffects on freshmen 
GPA (Grade Point Average). 3 
 
In addition, this study analyses which students are better off in ability-tracked and compre-
hensive school systems. Some countries, e.g. Germany or the Netherlands, group students by 
ability into different secondary school tracks at ages between 10 and 12. By contrast, the low-
er-secondary school systems of Japan, Norway, the UK, and the US are comprehensive and 
do not track at all.  
The analysis of the data suggests that pupils benefit from an increase in peer math achieve-
ment but higher-achieving students do so to a smaller extent. Peer heterogeneity, as measured 
by  peer  variance  and  alternative  measures  for  heterogeneity,  seems  not  to  affect  math 
achievement growth. The results also indicate that students learn more if their achievement is 
high at the beginning of a school year. Depending on the estimates, simulations show that 
slightly more than the majority of pupils would be better off in a comprehensive than in an 
ability-tracked school system. The simulations also suggest that the degree of homogeneity 
and  mean  achievement  of  the  student  body  becomes  somewhat  higher  in  comprehensive 
school. The major shortcoming of this study is related to the external validity of the results 
since they have been obtained from a sample of upper-secondary pupils. These might not be 
representative for the whole student body which could result, for instance, in biased simula-
tion results.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: section 2 briefly describes the data. The identifica-
tion strategy is outlined in section 3. Section 4 presents the main results. Using simulated da-
ta, the winners and losers from a school system change towards comprehensive school are 
described in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Data and summary statistics 
The German educational system is governed at the state level. Generally, elementary school 
lasts until the fourth grade when children are 10 years old. Thereafter students are tracked by 
ability into three diﬀerent types of secondary schools: lower-secondary (Hauptschule), mid-
dle-secondary  (Realschule),  and  upper-secondary  school  (Gymnasium).  Upper-secondary 
school is the most academic track and prepares students for university study. The Berlin edu-
cational system is somewhat different since primary education lasts six years. Some Berlin 
upper-secondary schools, however, allow transition already after four  years of elementary 
school.
7 In the following, these upper-secondary schools are referred to as G5 schools. In the 
                                                 
7 In contrast, transition into lower- or middle-secondary schools is not possible after the fourth grade.  4 
 
school year 2002/03 around 24,200 fourth graders attended one of 402 Berlin elementary 
schools. 7% of them changed to one of 31 G5 schools in the following school year.
8 
The data analyzed here is called ELEMENT.
9 It is a longitudinal survey on reading compre-
hension and math achievement for Berlin elementary and G5 pupils. In the primary school 
sample, classes at the fourth grade (primary sampling units) were  randomly drawn in the 
school year 2002/03. If the school of a drawn class hosted other classes at the fourth grade, 
one of them was additionally included in the sample to allow within-school comparisons. The 
primary school sample contains 13% of all elementary school fourth graders (71 schools, 140 
classes, 3293 pupils). This cohort of fourth graders was followed through grades  four to six. 
Further, all fifth graders that attended a G5 school in the school year 2003/04 were included 
and followed through grades five to six (31 schools, 59 classes, 1700 pupils).  
Participation in the standardized tests at the end of each school year was compulsory and test 
scores are comparable across grades and school types. A ttrition rates are therefore very low 
and solely caused by class repetitions, absence at the time of the test or school changes of 
followed pupils. Only a very small share, 3.5%, of G5 pupils were not observed for these rea-
sons. G5 fifth graders were also assessed at the beginning of the school year 2003/04 which is 
an important property for this study. Additional pupil information were collected  from ques-
tionnaires completed by students and parents on a voluntary basis. The data contain no infor-
mation about formerly attended elementary school classes of G5 pupils. 
Table 1 consists of two sections.  Section A presents descriptive statistics for the analyzed 
sample of G5 pupils.  For comparisons, second  B contains descriptive statistics for a repre-
sentative sample of  Berlin  fifth graders in primary education.  Math test scores  across all 
grades and school types  have been rescaled to mean zero and standard deviation one at the 
beginning of the fifth grade in G5 schools.
10 During a school year, G5 students' math skills 
increased by 0.81 standard deviations on average. Fifth graders in primary education exper i-
ence a smaller increase in math skills (0.72 standard deviations). Compared to G5 pupils, their 
average skill level at the beginning of the fifth grade is 1.29 standard deviations lower which 
is equivalent to one and a half school years. This large difference implies that external validity 
of the results could be restricted to upper-secondary school pupils. 
                                                 
8 At that time, the number of Berlin upper-secondary schools (including G5 schools) was 111.  
9 "Erhebung zum Lese- und Mathematikverständnis: Entwicklungen in den Jahrgangsstufen 4 bis 6 in Berlin", English trans-
lation: "Survey on reading comprehension and math achievement: Developments in grades 4 through 6 in Berlin". Detailed 
data descriptions and a codebook (both in German) are available on the homepages of the Berlin senate department for educa-
tion, science, and research (Berliner Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung). 
10 The standardization of all math test scores in the data with respect to G5 fifth graders is explained in Table A 1. 5 
 
Like math test scores in G5 schools, mean peer achievement at the beginning of the fifth 
grade in G5 schools also equals zero. Compared to peer achievement in elementary school, 
however, the standard deviation in peer achievement is much smaller in G5 schools. The 
summary statistics for peer variance show that the degree of within-class heterogeneity is 
somewhat larger in G5 schools. This indicates that G5 schools might not primarily seek to 
build up classes that are homogenous in math skills. Additionally, one can infer from the 
standard deviations of peer variance that the share of classes with a very high or low degree of 
peer variance is larger in the elementary school sample. Most G5 pupils have a favorable so-
cioeconomic background: 80% of their parents finished upper-secondary school and have at 
least 100 books at home. This could account for the large difference in mean achievement 
between G5 and elementary school fifth graders.
11 
3.  Exogenous variation in peer characteristics 
The functional relationship of interest has the general form 
        (                     ). 
     is pupil  's math test score in time 1 which is, for instance, the end of a school year. All 
explanatory variables are measured in the past, as indicated by the index 0, which could be the 
beginning of the school year. Past achievement      is assumed to capture sufficiently all pre-
vious school, peer, and family inputs.       is a set of additional explanatory variables for 
achievement growth.  
The variables of interest are peer achievement       and peer variance      , both measured at 
the class level in time 0. Peer achievement       is the average test score of  's classmates. The 
calculation of this average excludes      as emphasized by the subscript   . Computing       
in this manner rules out the possibility that any correlation between       and      is caused by 
    .
12 Peer variance       is calculated in a similar way.
13 
                                                 
11 A cross-country comparison in Woessmann (2004) shows that family background has strong effects on student achieve-
ment in the US and Western European countries. Among all countries, the strongest effects are found for the UK and Germa-
ny. A detailed analysis for the impact of socioeconomic background variables on educational attainment of Swiss pupils is 
given in Bauer and Riphahn (2007).  
12 To make this point clear, let      be the mean achievement in  's class (including  's own test score) which implies             
if two (different) pupils   and   attend the same class. Further, let        be the correlation coefficient between two variables 
  and  . Obviously,  (         )    . If  (         )     is also true, then      and      must be positively correlated. 
13 The computation of peer achievement and variance is explained in more detail in Table A 1. 6 
 
The experiment that could ideally be used to capture the causal effect of peer achievement and 
peer heterogeneity on student achievement would be random grouping of pupils into classes. 
Pupils who enter a G5 school after four years of primary education are in a similar situation 
since parents and schools have limited capabilities to condition their school-choice decisions 
on peer ability and heterogeneity and G5 schools might also not be interested in to do so.  
In primary education, the mean and variance of peer achievement could be endogenous for 
several reasons. If ambitious parents systematically keep their child away from attending clas-
ses or schools with underperforming or very heterogeneous peers, and if they are more likely 
to support the educational progress of their child (e.g. homework assistance, private lessons), 
then achievement growth and peer characteristics might be correlated. Endogeneity caused by 
omitted variables could also arise in elementary schools if certain school principals are inter-
ested in raising mean achievement by ability-grouping of pupils into classes. To do so, how-
ever, parents and school principals need to monitor pupils for a certain time.  
These problems do not arise or can be accounted for in G5 schools at the beginning of the 
fifth grade. Parents have to apply for a G5 school six months in advance of which implies that 
they cannot condition their application (and registration) at least on peer heterogeneity of the 
future G5 class. However, parents can expect that peer achievement in math is higher in G5 
schools with an emphasis on science.
14 Therefore all regressions for the impact off peer char-
acteristics on math growth solely exploit within-school variation in the dependent and explan-
atory variables. 
When G5 schools newly build up classes at the fifth grade, there is no reason to assume that 
the mean or variance of peer achievement is a determinant in this process : (i) the pool of ap-
plicants consists of high-achieving pupils with favorable learning environments. Therefore 
ability-grouping should not play an important role in G5 schools. (ii) Even if G5 schools aim 
at grouping pupils by skill, they have insufficient informati on to do so.  Selection into G5 
schools mainly depends on a pupil's ability which is measured by school grades from elemen-
tary school. Compared to standardized achievement tests, school grades are far from a perfect 
measure of skills.
15 At best, school grades allow comparisons of pupils that attended the same 
class in elementary school. However, the number of elementary schools is 13 times larger 
than the number of G5 schools such that most fifth graders in G5 schools previously attended 
                                                 
14 G5 schools differ: some of them focus more on science, others on humanities. 
15 For example, Dardanoni, Modica, and Pennsi (2009) find for 14 of 16 OECD countries that schools with high shares of 
underperforming students tend to set lower grading standards.  7 
 
different classes in different elementary schools.
16 Even if pupils are homogenous in terms of 
school grades, they  might still be heterogeneous in skills.  (iii) The descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 suggest that G5 schools do not seek to sort pupils by  skill since G5 classes are more 
heterogeneous in math achievement than classes in elementary education. When building up 
new classes at the fifth grade, it is more likely that G5 schools try  to balance the shares of 
boys and girls across classes. As shown in OECD (2004), girls outperform boys in reading 
and underperform in math.
17 Consequently, it is difficult to build up mixed classes that are 
homogenous in math and reading achievement at the same time.  
This reasoning motivates the identification strategy:  within-school variation in the mean and 
variance of peer achievement is assumed to be exogenous and estimates of their coefficients 
may be interpreted causally. To test the exogeneity of peer achievement and variance at the 
fifth grade in G5 schools, these two variables are regressed on math achievement and  other 
explanatory variables in Table 2. All variables are measured at the beginning of the school 
year. For easier interpretation, the dependent variables have been r escaled to mean zero and 
standard deviation one. Columns 1 and 3 do not account for  school fixed effects – these are 
controlled for in columns 2 and 4.  
In the case of perfect randomization, one would expect insignificant estimates with absolute 
values close to zero. One can infer from Table 2, column 1 that higher-achieving students are 
more likely to have abler peers. The point estimate is large and highly significant. Thus results 
from regressions that exclude school fixed effects might be biased because of self-selection of 
high-achievers into classes with abler peers. As already mentioned, mean math achievement 
could be higher in G5 schools that put an emphasis on science and lower in G5 schools focus-
ing more on humanities. The results from column 2 seem to confirm this hypothesis: Once 
school fixed effects are accounted for, the point estimate for math achievement remains sig-
nificant, but turns into negative with an absolute value close to zero. Similarly, peer variance 
and student achievement are correlated, but point estimates in columns 3 and 4 are also close 
to zero.  
Regarding  the  remaining  explanatory  variables,  there  seems  to  be  no  systematical  self-
selection into classes or schools with specific levels of peer achievement or variance since 
                                                 
16 Since class size is smaller in elementary schools, the number of elementary school classes exceeds the number of G5 clas-
ses to the 17-fold. 
17 This pattern can be found for most OECD countries that participated in PISA 2003 (Programme for International Student 
Assessment). Average gender-differences in math and reading achievement are reported in  OECD (2004), Figures 2.18. and 
6.6, respectively. 8 
 
most related coefficients are either insignificant or close to zero. Further, the few significant 
estimates are not robust since they are sensitive to the in- or exclusion of school fixed effects. 
Summing up, endogeneity cannot be ruled out completely, but is likely to play a minor role 
once school fixed effects are taken into account. 
4.  Results 
The impact of peer characteristics on achievement growth is estimated with the following 
baseline-model of educational production: 
                                                            
     is pupil  's math test score at the end of the fifth grade as indicated by the subscript 1. All 
variables on the RHS are indexed with 0 which stands for "beginning of fifth grade". The ex-
planatory variables are therefore predetermined which rules out simultaneity. Peer achieve-
ment       is the average test score of  's classmates at the beginning of the fifth grade. By 
assumption,       sufficiently captures past school and family inputs of the peers. Since G5 
classes are built up from a large pool of elementary school fourth graders, the probability is 
small that pupils who are grouped into a G5 class previously attended the same elementary 
school classes. Therefore       should not be biased because of peer-interactions in the past. 
      is the variance of  's peers. 
     is pupil  's class percentile rank in math test scores. By definition,             . Within 
classes, the highest-achieving pupil has rank one, the median-achiever has rank 0.5 and the 
lowest-achiever has rank zero.     , the math test score at the beginning of the fifth grade, is 
the most important control variable. It captures  's past educational inputs and additionally 
accounts for the correlation between      and     .
18    is a column-vector which contains a 
constant and a set of additional controls, namely: age, a girl dummy, and the highest educa-
tional background of parents.    is a school fixed effect. Disturbances    allow for correlated 
residuals among students that attend same G5 classes. 
Table 3 reports estimates for the impact of peer characteristics on math achievement growth 
in G5 schools. It is divided into a top and a bottom section. Section A excludes additional 
controls   – these are taken into account in section B. Across all specifications (columns 1-4) 
                                                 
18 Pupils with high test scores are likely to have a high rank. If past achievement      is left out in a regression of present 
achievement      on past rank     , then past rank would pick up the correlation between past and present achievement. On the 
other hand, two pupils with same test score may have different ranks if they attend different classes.  9 
 
the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of   but become somewhat more precise. For eas-
ier interpretation, peer achievement and peer variance have sample mean zero and standard 
deviation one. 
Estimates in column 1 suggest that higher ranked pupils learn more during a school year.
19 
This is consistent with Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), who also find that a student's relative 
position among his or her peers is an important determinant of his or her academic success. 
The point estimate for peer variance is close to zero and insignificant.  The impact of peer 
achievement is positive and significant in section B only, the significance test yields a p-value 
of 0.13 in section A. 
In both sections, the effect of peer achievement  is estimated with low precision since  highly 
ranked pupils benefit less from an increase in peer achievement (column 2). Depending on the 
estimates in section B, column 2, the total derivative with respect to peer achievement and 
class percentile rank is:  
        (                  )        (                 )       
The first term indicates that students benefit from an rank increase, however, the effect is 
smaller in classes with high peer achievement.
20 Regarding the second term, all pupils benefit 
from an increase in peer achievement since             , but highly ranked pupils do so to a 
smaller extent.
21 One common explanation for this pattern is that low -ability students might 
learn from better-achieving peers during a school year. Since highly ranked pupils do not have 
this advantage, their returns to an increase in peer achievement are diminishing. Further, one 
can infer from these findings  that placing an (average)  pupil into a class with low peer 
achievement is not necessarily harmful: on the one hand, that pupil's educational progress is 
lowered by its peers, on the other, that pupil is likely to benefit from an increase in its percen-
tile rank. 
The third column in Table 3 checks weather pupils also respond differently to changes in peer 
variance. Like in previous specifications (columns 1-2), peer variance does not harm G5 fifth 
graders. The fully interacted model (column 4) confirms the findings from the second specifi-
cation: pupils benefit from an increase in peer achievement or their rank and peer variance is 
irrelevant. These patterns (significance levels, relations among estimates) remain the same if 
                                                 
19 All regressions in Table 3 and Table 4 control for student achievement at the beginning of the fifth grade. 
20 The effect in the first term becomes negative if             , which is extremely high.  
21 This relation is also found in Sund (2009) and Zimmer (2003). 10 
 
controls for missing or imputed values are left out from the regressions, but absolute values of 
the estimates become about 10% larger in that case.  
So far, the results show that peer heterogeneity does not harm student achievement. To test 
this finding, Table 4 reports results for alternative measures for heterogeneity. Column 1 con-
trols for peer variance. These estimates are therefore identical with the fourth column in Table 
3, section B. In the second column of Table 4, peer standard deviation instead of peer variance 
is used to measure heterogeneity. The additional alternative measures (columns 3-6) are con-
stant among pupils that attend the same classes – these measures therefore only vary across 
classes. Colums 3 and 4 report results for the "common" variance and standard deviation (in-
cluding pupil  ), respectively. Columns 5 and 6 show results for two measures for the range. 
The  range  is  a  test  score  difference  between  two  pupils  that  attend  the  same  class. 
Range(100/0) is the test score difference between the most able and the least able student 
whereas range(90/10) captures the test score difference of the two pupils with percentile ranks 
0.90 and 0.10. 
All estimates for the impact of peer heterogeneity and the interaction between rank and peer 
heterogeneity are (jointly) insignificant in Table 4 and the main findings from Table 3 are 
confirmed. The results in Table 4 are virtually unaffected by the in- or exclusion of additional 
controls   and control variables for missing or imputed values. If peer achievement and vari-
ous measures for peer heterogeneity are not interacted with the percentile rank, the results 
become very similar to the findings reported in Table 3, column 1.  
5.  Are pupils better off in a comprehensive or ability-tracked school system? 
This section aims to identify which groups of pupils are better off in ability-tracked compared 
to comprehensive school systems. Ability-tracking implies that the heterogeneity in student 
achievement within tracks is smaller than the heterogeneity of the whole student body. Fur-
ther, mean achievement of students enrolled in the highest-level track exceeds mean achieve-
ment  in  the  lower-level  tracks.  Compared  to  ability-tracking,  classes  in  comprehensive 
schools  are  similar  in  terms  of  mean  achievement  and  tend  to  be  more  heterogeneous. 
Hanushek and W oessmann (2006) provide empirical evidence that the heterogeneity of the 
student body increases in countries with tracked school systems. They also find that early 
tracking might reduce mean performance.  
Simulations are a tool for identifying students that would benefit and suffer from a school-
system change from ability-tracking towards comprehensive school. Using the estimates from 11 
 
the  previous  section,  one  could  predict  and  compare  each  student's  achievement  in  both 
school systems. The setup of the simulation implemented here is simple: there are two points 
in time, beginning and end of the school year which are referred to as time 0 and time 1. In 
time 0, a pupil's initial ability is drawn from the standard normal distribution. These pupils are 
then either grouped by ability into three different tracks or randomly placed into classes.
22 For 
both scenarios (tracked or comprehensive school), the rank and peer achievement are comput-
ed for time 0. In time 0, the expected value of mean achievement in the middle track equals 
the expected value of mean achievement in any comprehensive school class. Using the esti-
mates in Table 3 (column 2, section B), each pupil's potential achievement growth  in both 
school systems is then predicted.
23 Predictions solely depend on the rank, peer achievement 
and the interaction between rank and peer achievement. 
The winners and losers from a school system change towards comprehensive school are d e-
scribed in Table 5. In columns 1 and 2, pupils are assigned to six groups (column 1) depend-
ing on their initial achievement in  time 0. Initial achievement is drawn from the standard 
normal distribution and pupils are ordered by their percentiles in the achievement distribution 
(column 2). For instance, all  pupils in group 1 and 2 belong to the bottom third of the 
achievement distribution.
24 
Columns 3 to 5 contain information about each group's situation in the ability-tracked scenar-
io. One can infer from column 3, that all pupils from group 1 and 2 would have attended low-
er-secondary school, and all pupils from the top third of the achievement distribution (groups 
5 and 6) would be enrolled in upper -secondary education. In an ability-tracked system, peer 
achievement is heterogeneous among secondary school types (column 4). For example, aver-
age-achievers (groups 3 and 4) are expected to attend middle -secondary school where peer 
achievement is expected to be zero which is the median of the standard normal distribution. 
Consequently, peer achievement in lower-secondary or upper-secondary school is expected to 
be smaller or greater than zero, respectively. Regarding their ranks, pupils from groups 2, 4, 
and 6 are expected to have high ranks within their assigned secondary school track (column 
                                                 
22 Without any loss in generality, the simulated data used here solely consists of 90 pupils that are grouped (by ability or 
randomly) into three classes of size 30. The number of replications is 10,000 which ensures the robustness of the results. For 
each replication, the random-number seed is set to the current value of the replication counter. 
23 The results presented in this section are not sensitive to the used set of estimates  from column 2 (section A or B, with or 
without controls for missing and imputed values).  
24 The numerical values of the thresholds in column 2 are obtained from a large number (10,000) of replications. For each 
replication, these thresholds somewhat differ from the valu es in column 2. Column 2 reports average values of thresholds 
across all replications. 12 
 
5).
25 For instance, pupils from group 4 do not belong to the highest -achievers in the whole 
student body (see column 2). Within middle-secondary school, however, column 5 shows that 
these pupils are likely to have high ranks. 
Columns 6 to 8 display each groups' situation in the comprehensive school scenario. Regard-
less of their initial ability (column 2), all pupils would have attended comprehensive school 
(column 6). Peer achievement in comprehensive school is expected to be zero which is the 
mean of the standard normal distribution (column 7). Since pupils are grouped randomly into 
classes, each class might be considered as a representative sample of the whole student body. 
Therefore each pupil's rank (column 8) and percentile in the achievement distribution (column 
2) are  expected to be  very similar in comprehensive school. For instance, the highest -
achievers among all students (group 6, column 2) are  expected to have the highest ranks in 
comprehensive school too.   
As already mentioned in the previous section, placing an (average) pupil into a class with low 
peer achievement is accompanied by two adverse effects: on the one hand, that pupil suffers 
from the low achievement of its peers, on the other, that pupil is likely to benefit from an in-
crease in his or her percentile rank. To identify the winners and losers from a school system 
change towards comprehensive school, one first needs to predict student achievement in  time 
1 for both scenarios: 
    
             
              
             
       
   
Where the superscript           indicates the type of school system (tracked or comprehen-
sive). The coefficients are from Table 3, section B, column 2. From the viewpoint of the 
simulation, a school system change simply implies a change in peer achievement and class 
ranks in time 0: 
            
        
                                              
Here, a change towards comprehensive school is considered. Therefore       is defined as 
    
        
  . Same reasoning applies for the remaining variables. The six groups of pupils in 
Table 5 are differently affected by a change of the school system from ability-tracking to-
wards comprehensive school. Column 9 shows the expected changes in peer achievement 
                                                 
25 The numerical values of the thresholds in column 5 are calculated from the values in column 2:                          , 
                    ̅      , and                     ̅     . 13 
 
      : For instance, all pupils that would have attended lower-secondary school (groups 1 
and 2) experience higher levels of peer achievement in comprehensive school, therefore a 
school  system  change  towards  comprehensive  school  would  imply  an  increase  in  peer 
achievement for these pupils. However, potential upper-secondary school pupils (groups 5 
and 6) are confronted with less abler peers in comprehensive school as indicated by the nega-
tive values of       .  
Column 10 shows the expected change in the rank      . Pupils that would have attended up-
per-secondary school (groups 5 and 6) clearly benefit from a rank increase in the case of 
school system change towards comprehensive school. On the other hand, potential lower-
secondary school pupils (groups 1 and 2) are ranked lower in comprehensive school. Among 
all subgroups, pupils from the second or fifth group are expected to experience the largest 
changes in their rank.  
The main finding from the simulations is reported in column 11: Pupils that would be ranked 
around 0.50 or below in secondary school (column 5) are the winners from a change in the 
school system.
26 This result differs from Zimmer (2003) who suggests that that detracking 
schools has positive effects on all lower-achieving students but no effects on high-achievers.  
Since student achievement in time 1 can be predicted for the ability-tracked and comprehen-
sive school scenario, one can quantify the shares of winners  (and losers) form a change to-
wards comprehensive school. The expected value for the share of winners is 53% which indi-
cates that slightly more than the majority of students are (expected to be) better off in co m-
prehensive school.
27 Further, all replications show that mean achievement of the whole stu-
dent body (in time 1) is slightly larger in the comprehensive school scenario . The student 
body also becomes a bit more homogenous in time 1 if the school system changes towards 
comprehensive school. These findings therefore provide a possible explanation for the results 
reported in Hanushek and W oessmann (    ).  
                                                 
26 To be more precise, the winners are potential lower-secondary pupils with tracked percentile rank below 0.39 (group 1), 
potential middle-secondary pupils with tracked percentile rank below 0.50 (group 3), and potential upper-secondary pupils 
with tracked percentile rank below 0.64 (group 5). 
27      
 
 ∑   
 
    , where            is the total number of replications and    is the share of winners in replication  . 
Consequently,          is the related share of losers. The simulations show that                          , and          
                 ,                     , and                            . The three probabilities sum up to 1. 14 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
This paper intends to estimate the causal impact of peer achievement and of various measures 
for peer heterogeneity on math achievement. Exploiting a natural experiment in a sample of 
Berlin fifth graders in upper-secondary school, the results indicate that pupils benefit from 
abler peers, but pupils with high class percentile ranks do so at diminishing rates. Holding 
other things constant, a one standard deviation increase in peer achievement at the beginning 
of a school year improves a median-ranked student's test score by roughly 0.12 standard devi-
ations. Further, peer heterogeneity seems not to harm achievement growth. 
Depending on the estimates, results from simulations suggest that pupils are slightly better off 
in comprehensive than in ability-tracked school systems. To be more precise, all pupils that 
would have been below-median-achievers in their assigned track benefit from a school system 
change towards comprehensive school. In that case, however, the other half of students expe-
riences a decrease in achievement growth. This differs from Zimmer (2003) who finds that 
detracking schools has positive effects on all lower-achieving pupils but no effects on high-
achievers.  The  simulations  also  show  that  both,  the  degree  of  homogeneity  and  mean 
achievement of the student body, become somewhat higher in the comprehensive school sce-
nario. Regarding external  validity, all results  might  be representative for upper-secondary 
school pupils only. 
Basically, this study made a before-after comparison: how will the outcome variable look like 
in time 1 if explanatory variables are changed in time 0? It did not make an attempt to uncov-
er the mechanisms that operate during a school year, which is challenging because of, for in-
stance, the presence of simultaneity. As mentioned by Hanushek et al. (2003), "The role of 
peers can be complex. Influences may come from friends or role models, or peer group com-
position may alter the nature of instruction in the classroom… The most common perspective 
is that peers, like families, are sources of motivation, aspiration, and direct interactions in 
learning." Further research could also address the question why students additionally benefit 
from their class percentile rank even if past student achievement is taken into account. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for G5 and elementary school fifth graders 
Section:  A: G5 schools  B: Elem. schools 
  Mean  s.d.  Missings  Mean  s.d. 
Student achievement:           
  Math achievement (end)  0.81  0.96  0.00  -0.57  1.06 
  Math achievement (beginning)  0.00  1.00  0.03  -1.29  1.02 
Peer characteristics:           
  Peer math achievement (beg.)  0.00  0.33  0.03  -1.29  0.48 
  Peer math variance (beginning)  0.90  0.28  0.03  0.81  0.35 
Other pupil characteristics:           
  Age  11.32  0.43  0.01  11.57  0.59 
  Girl  0.52    0.00  0.49   
Books at home:           
  0-25  0.07    0.11  0.30   
  26-100  0.16    0.11  0.29   
  101-200  0.18    0.11  0.14   
  more than 200  0.59    0.11  0.27   
Parental education:           
  Lower-secondary  0.02    0.13  0.13   
  Middle-secondary  0.19    0.13  0.45   
  Upper-secondary  0.79    0.13  0.42   
Class/school characteristics:           
  Class size  29.45  3.43  0.00  23.23  3.35 
  Located in East Germany  0.38    0.00  0.37   
N(pupils)  1642      3081   
N(classes)  59      138   
N(schools)  31      71   
Standard deviations not reported for dummy variables. The column "missings" reports the share of missing val-
ues. "Math achievement (end)/(beginning)" is the student math achievement at the end/beginning of the fifth 
grade. The original test scores in the data have been rescaled to mean zero and standard deviation one at the 
beginning of the fifth grade in G5 schools (see Table A 1 for additional information). "Peer achievement" and 
"peer variance" are the achievement mean and variance of a pupil's classmates (both measured at the beginning 
of the fifth grade). Parental education contains the highest secondary school degree of parents. 
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Table 2: Exogeneity of peer achievement and peer variance (G5 schools, fifth grade) 
Dependent Variable:                     Peer achievement  Peer variance 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
School fixed effects:  no  yes  no  yes 
Pupil characteristics:         
  Math achievement             0.220***  -0.029**  -0.089***  -0.068*** 
                      (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
  Age  -0.025  -0.046*  -0.135**  -0.033 
                      (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
  Girl  0.066  0.053**  -0.014  -0.049 
                      (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Books at home:         
(Ref. category: more than 200 books)         
  101-200 Books               0.011  0.011  -0.073  -0.049 
                      (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.05) 
  26-100 Books          -0.146*  -0.006  -0.009  0.056 
                      (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
  0-25 Books             0.019  0.132**  -0.010  -0.135 
                      (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.08) 
Parental education:         
(Ref. category: upper-secondary)         
  Middle-secondary  -0.161**  0.006  -0.058  -0.039 
                      (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.05) 
  Lower-secondary  -0.311  -0.093  0.116  0.175 
                      (0.19)  (0.09)  (0.20)  (0.14) 
R
2 (adj.)  0.0603  0.7921  0.0125  0.4960 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors in parentheses. Used data: ELMENT fifth graders in 
G5 schools (1592 Obs.). For easier interpretation, the dependent variables have been rescaled to mean zero and 
standard deviation one. All variables are measured at the beginning of the fifth grade. All regressions include a 
constant and controls for missing or imputed values. 
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Table 3: Impact of peer characteristics on student achievement (G5 schools, fifth grade) 
Dependent variable:  Math achievement (end of fifth grade) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Section A: No additional controls         
  Rank (1=best)         0.434*  0.491*  0.540**  0.576** 
  (0.254)  (0.255)  (0.252)  (0.253) 
  Peer achievement  0.102  0.200***  0.11  0.200*** 
  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.067) 
  Peer variance  -0.005  -0.005  -0.072  -0.06 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.044)  (0.045) 





    (0.057)    (0.058) 
  Rank*p-variance  
   
0.129*  0.107 
      (0.076)  (0.080) 
R
2 (adj.)  0.3961  0.3988  0.3972  0.3994 
Section B: Including additional controls         
  Rank (1=best)         0.418*  0.476*  0.513**  0.549** 
  (0.249)  (0.251)  (0.250)  (0.251) 
  Peer achievement  0.114*  0.210***  0.120*  0.210*** 
  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.064) 
  Peer variance  -0.006  -0.005  -0.065  -0.053 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.045)  (0.047) 





    (0.055)    (0.057) 
  Rank*p-variance  
   
0.115  0.094 
      (0.076)  (0.081) 
R
2 (adj.)  0.4006  0.4033  0.4014  0.4036 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors that allow for correlated residuals among 
students in the same class are in parentheses. Used data: ELEMENT fifth graders in G5 schools (1642 observa-
tions). "Additional controls" are: age, a girl dummy, books at home and parental education. All explanatory 
variables are measured at the beginning of the fifth grade. All regressions include a constant, student achieve-
ment in math (beginning of the school year), school fixed effects and controls for missing or imputed values. 
"Rank" is a pupil's class percentile  rank in  math. By definition, the rank lies between zero and one. "Peer 
achievement" and "peer variance" are the achievement mean and variance of a pupil's classmates. For easier 
interpretation, "Peer achievement" and "Peer variance" have sample  mean  zero and standard deviation one. 
"Rank*p-achievement" is an interaction term between pupil Rank and peer achievement. "Rank*p-variance" is 
constructed in the same manner. 
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Table 4: Impact of peer heterogeneity (alternative measures) on student achievement 
Dependent variable:  Math achievement (end of fifth grade) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Rank (1=best)  0.549**  0.545**  0.601**  0.598**  0.482*  0.485* 
  (0.251)  (0.253)  (0.263)  (0.264)  (0.254)  (0.264) 
Peer achievement  0.210***  0.210***  0.215***  0.215***  0.217***  0.211*** 
 
(0.064)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.062)  (0.063) 
Rank*p-achievement  -0.165*** -0.166*** -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.175*** -0.178*** 
 
(0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.056) 
Peer variance  -0.053 
 
 





      Rank*p-variance   0.094 
 
 
                 (0.081) 
 
 
      Peer standard deviation  
 
-0.049   
                           
 
(0.045)   
      Rank*peer standard dev. 
 
0.086 
       
 
  (0.079) 
        Variance         
 
-0.056     
                         
 
(0.049)     
  Rank* variance   
 
0.098     
                         
 
(0.083)   
    Standard deviation               
   
-0.054 
                           
   
(0.048) 
    Rank*standard deviation   
   
0.096 
                           
   
(0.080) 
    Range(100/0)   
     
0.029 
                       
       
(0.044) 
  Rank*range(100/0) 
       
0.01 
                       
       
(0.067) 
  Range(90/10)            
         
-0.033 
                     
         
(0.055) 
Rank*range(90/10) 
         
0.013 
                     
         
(0.104) 
Joint p-value  0.5069  0.5447  0.4937  0.4927  0.4879  0.2727 
R
2 (adj.)  0.4036  0.4035  0.4036  0.4036  0.4035  0.4032 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors that allow for correlated residuals among 
students in the same class are in parentheses. Used data: ELEMENT fifth graders in G5 schools (1642 observa-
tions). " Joint p-value" is the p-value for the joint significance of the measure of heterogeneity and its interaction. 
"Peer variance" is the achievement variance of a pupil's classmates. "Variance" and "standard deviation" are the 
within-class variance and standard deviation in student achievement. The range is a test score difference between 
two pupils that attend the same class. "Range(100/0)" is the test score difference between the most able and the 
least able student whereas "range(90/10)" captures the test score difference of the two pupils with percentile 
ranks 0.90 and 0.10. All regressions include a constant, student achievement in math (beginning of the school 




Table 5: Expected winners and losers of a school system change from ability-tracking towards comprehensive school 
Initial student achieve-
ment in time 0 
Scenario A:  
Ability-tracked school system 
Scenario B:  
Comprehensive school 
Change from ability-tracking 
towards comprehensive school 
Gr.  Achievement  
percentile    
School type  Peer 
ach.   
  
Rank   
   School 
type 
Peer 
ach.   
  
Rank   
   Change 
in     
Change 
in    
net effect 
in time 1 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
1.                    lower-sec.    
                
          comp.    
                
                              positive 
2.                   ̅  lower-sec.    
                
          comp.    
                
         ̅                      negative 
3.       ̅              middle-sec.    
                
          comp.    
            ̅     
                              positive 
4.                   ̅  middle-sec.    
                
          comp.    
                
         ̅                      negative 
5.       ̅              upper-sec.    
                
          comp.    
            ̅     
                              positive 
6.                    upper-sec.    
                
          comp.    
                
                              negative 
This figure displays the expected situation of the student body in two different school systems: ability-tracking (columns 3 to 5) and comprehensive school (columns 6 to 8) 
which is also indicated by the superscripts   and  . Pupils are assigned to six groups (column 1) depending on their initial achievement in time 0. Initial achievement is drawn 
from the standard normal distribution and pupils are ordered by their percentile    in the achievement distribution (column 2). In both scenarios (ability-tracking or comprehen-
sive school) pupils from different groups are confronted with certain peers (columns 4 and 7) and have certain ranks (columns 5 and 8). The impact of a school system change 
from ability-tracking towards comprehensive school for different groups is reported in columns 9 to 11. "Change in   " is defined as follows:        
      
  and         
   
  






Table A 1: Computation of various variables 
Task   Description 
Standardization of 
original values of math 
test scores across all 
grades and school 
types 
Let         
   be pupil  's original math test score in the data (as indi-
cated  by  the  star  superscript)  enrolled  at  grade               in 
school           in time          .       if   attends elementary 
school and       if   attends a G5 school.       if    has been 
measured at the beginning of the school year, otherwise        
(end of the school year). Further, let         
   and         
   be the mean 
and standard deviation of    of G5 fifth graders in the beginning 
of the school year.  
Math test scores  across all grades and school  types are then re-
scaled as follows:            (        
            
  )         
  .  
Peer achievement       and peer variance       are then computed 
from         . 
 
Computation of peer 
achievement       and 
peer variance       
       
 
    ∑                , where    is the set of pupil IDs that at-
tend class   and    denotes the number of elements in   . Similar-
ly,        
 
    ∑ (             )
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